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I. INTRODUCTION
1

A widely accepted ancient legal maxim states that “ignorance of
2
fact may excuse; ignorance of law does not excuse.” But what if the
† J.D. Candidate 2005, William Mitchell College of Law; B.F.A. Minneapolis
College of Art and Design, 1987.
1. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 883 (5th ed. 1979) (defining maxim as “[a] principle
of law universally admitted as being a correct statement of the law, or as agreeable to
reason”).
2. Advanced Estimating Sys., Inc. v. Riney, 130 F.3d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1997)
(citation omitted) (holding that an attorney’s misunderstanding of a rule’s plain language
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ignorance is that of the attorney and not the client? The common remedy
for clients in civil matters who are denied their day in court due to
negligence or mistake on the part of their counsel is to seek damages
3
through a malpractice suit. While Minnesota courts have long stated the
liberal policy of declining to penalize litigants for neglect or mistakes of
4
their attorneys, the courts are not always equally liberal in applying that
5
policy.
6
Recently, in the case of In re Welfare of J.R., Jr., a proceeding
involving the termination of a mother’s parental rights, the Minnesota
Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether to affirm a court of
appeals order dismissing the mother’s appeal for failure to timely serve
7
notice on the child’s guardian ad litem, or to excuse the delay under an
analysis similar to that required when a party seeks relief from a final
judgment or order under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 (“Rule
8
60.02”). The appellant argued that in cases involving the termination of

cannot constitute excusable neglect); see also Midwest Employers Cas. Co. v. Williams,
161 F.3d 877, 879 (5th Cir. 1998) (overruling the magistrate’s holding that late filing of
an appeal was excusable because counsel misread a rule).
3. See, e.g., Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 634 n.10 (1962); Pryor v.
U.S. Postal Serv., 769 F.2d 281, 289 (5th Cir. 1985); Murray v. Solidarity of Labor Org.
Int’l Union Benefit Fund, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1143 (N.D. Iowa 2001); State v. Linder,
33 P.3d 1023, 1025 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).
4. See, e.g., Nguyen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 558 N.W.2d 487, 491
(Minn. 1997) (agreeing that a client “should not be a victim of his attorney’s
carelessness”); Charson v. Temple Israel, 419 N.W.2d 488, 491 (Minn. 1988)
(recognizing that even though under the general principles of agency where attorney
neglect is chargeable to the client, the court has scrutinized the client’s actions apart from
that of the attorney); Duenow v. Lindeman, 223 Minn. 505, 518, 27 N.W.2d 421, 429
(1947) (“Courts will relieve parties from the consequences of the neglect or mistakes of
their attorney when it can be done without substantial prejudice to their adversaries.”).
5. See, e.g., In re Welfare of J.R., Jr., 655 N.W.2d 1, 3-6 (Minn. 2003) (refusing
appellant’s request that the court excuse late filing of appeal by one of the parties to the
matter when the late filing was due to error on the part of the attorney); In re D.B., 463
N.W.2d 301, 303 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (dismissing appellant’s untimely appeal where
error was committed by appellant’s attorney).
6. 655 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2003).
7. BLACK’S, supra note 1, at 635 (defining guardian ad litem as “a special
guardian appointed by the court to prosecute or defend, on behalf of an infant . . . a suit to
which he is a party, and such guardian is considered an officer of the court to represent
the interests of the infant . . . in the litigation”). In Minnesota, a guardian ad litem is a
party to a termination of parental rights action. MINN. R. JUV. P. 57.01 subd. 1. The
guardian ad litem is appointed by the court to protect, monitor, and advocate for the
child’s best interests throughout the judicial proceeding. MINN. STAT. § 260C.163 subd.
5(b)(4) (2002).
8. J.R., 655 N.W.2d at 4. Although the appeal had not been timely filed with the
guardian ad litem, the appeal had been timely served with the court of appeals and with
the respondent. Id. at 2.
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parental rights, a technical violation of the rules should not prevent the
9
appeal from proceeding. However, the court refused to apply a Rule
60.02 type analysis and chose not to exercise its inherent power to hear
10
an untimely appeal in the interests of justice.
Basing its decision
largely on the policy that child protection cases need to be handled
expeditiously, the court held that an untimely appeal deprives the
11
appellate court of jurisdiction and affirmed the court of appeals order.
Part II of this note explores the primary legal concepts raised in
12
J.R.: the application of a Rule 60.02 analysis, the effect that an
13
untimely appeal has on jurisdiction of Minnesota appellate courts, and
14
extensions for time to appeal under the federal rules. Part III reviews
the pertinent facts of J.R. as well as the court’s holding and stated policy
15
for reaching that decision. Part IV analyzes the court’s decision and
current precedent from other jurisdictions that may provide insight and
16
guidance.
It also examines the policy behind J.R. and provides a
17
context in which the effectiveness of that policy should be judged.
Finally, this note suggests that in the case of J.R., the Minnesota
Supreme Court should have recognized that in some civil cases, such as
those involving termination of parental rights, the accepted civil remedy
of allowing clients to recover for the failure of counsel through a
18
malpractice suit is inadequate.
The court should have used an
excusable neglect analysis rather than a Rule 60.02 analysis to examine
19
Upon
the reason for the attorney’s failure to file a timely appeal.
satisfaction of the excusable neglect analysis, the court should have
exercised its constitutional power to hear a late appeal in the interests of
20
justice.

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 5-6.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.A.1-2.
See infra Part IV.A.3.
See infra Part IV.B.
Id.
Id.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Relief Under Minnesota Rule 60.02
Traditionally, the subject of granting relief from a judgment was
21
denominated as equitable relief. Infused with notions associated with
equity jurisdiction, equitable relief included the familiar concepts of:
“discretion on the part of the court, due diligence on the part of the
applicant for relief, and the balancing of interests as between the
parties . . . and the public concerns for both just adjudication and the
22
finality of judgments.” Modern procedures, particularly those similar
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), have largely superseded the
23
need for an independent suit in equity.
The Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure became effective on
January 1, 1952, and were in large part taken verbatim from the
24
corresponding Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Minnesota Rule
60.02, like its federal counterpart Rule 60(b), provides in part that on
motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, or any other reason
25
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
In determining whether relief should be granted under Rule 60.02,
Minnesota courts traditionally have employed a four-prong test that
requires the party seeking relief to demonstrate: “(1) a reasonable
defense on the merits; (2) a reasonable excuse for . . . failure to act; (3)
that [the party] acted with due diligence after notice of the entry of
judgment; and (4) that no substantial prejudice will result to the opposing

21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS ch. 5, introductory note (1982).
22. Id.
23. JAMES FLEMING, JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 13.15 (2d ed.
1977). The suit in equity still has a function where the attack on the judgment is made by
a person who was not a party to the suit or where the person who obtained the judgment
sues on it in another jurisdiction. Id.
24. 1 DOUGLAS D. MCFARLAND & WILLIAM J. KEPPEL, MINNESOTA CIVIL PRACTICE
§ 131 (2d ed. 1990).
25. Compare MINN. R. CIV. P. 60.02 with FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). “The federal
courts’ interpretation of federal rules of civil procedure often provide guidance to state
courts in their interpretation of parallel rules.” Edward T. Matthews, Case Note, The
Unfortunate Elevation of Finality Over Validity—Bode v. Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res.,
28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1217, 1226 n.78 (2002) (citing DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566
N.W.2d 60, 69 (Minn. 1997)). Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was
modeled after section 473 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. 12 JAMES WM.
MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 60 App.100[1] (3d ed. 1999).
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26

party if the motion to vacate is granted.” In Minnesota, all four prongs
27
must be satisfied in order to justify relief. If the district court fails to
28
apply the four-prong test, the appellate court will do so de novo.
29
Because a Rule 60 motion is part of or a continuation of the
original action, it generally must be made in the court that rendered
30
judgment. The court that entered judgment has automatic jurisdiction
31
and is in the best position to judge the merits of the motion. However,
the right to be relieved of judgment is not absolute, even upon a showing
32
of the prerequisites for relief. Whether to vacate a judgment is at the
trial court’s discretion, and the decision will not be reversed on appeal
33
absent a clear abuse of discretion.
B. Untimely Appeals and Appellate Court Jurisdiction in Minnesota
The Minnesota Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure were adopted by
the Minnesota Supreme Court in 1967, and in large part they superseded
34
previous statutory provisions relating to appeals. Prior to the adoption,
although appellate procedure was generally regulated by statutory
provisions, commentary and case law suggest that the court’s acceptance
35
of these legislative prescriptions was a result of comity and not a result
36
of legislative power over the supreme court.
26. Nguyen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 558 N.W.2d 487, 490 (Minn. 1997)
(citation omitted). The four-prong test has been used in Minnesota since the late 1800s.
See Brown v. Brown, 37 Minn. 128, 129, 33 N.W. 546, 547 (1887) (using similar
elements in a relief for good cause analysis).
27. Charson v. Temple Israel, 419 N.W.2d 488, 491-92 (Minn. 1988).
28. Carter v. Anderson, 554 N.W.2d 110, 115 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
29. “Rule 60 motion” refers to a motion for relief from final judgment under federal
or state law.
30. MOORE, supra note 25, at § 60.60[1]; see also United States v. Shaughnessy,
175 F.2d 211, 212 (2d Cir. 1949) (refusing to transform improper collateral attack on
denaturalization decree into a Rule 60(b) motion because it was not filed in the court that
rendered original judgment); Bankers Mortgage Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 73, 78 &
n.9 (5th Cir. 1970) (noting that a motion for relief from final judgment must be filed in
the court in which the original judgment was entered).
31. MOORE, supra note 25, at § 60.60[1].
32. See Bentonize, Inc. v. Green, 431 N.W.2d 579, 583 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
33. See, e.g., Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Dain Bosworth, Inc., 531 N.W.2d 867, 87374 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); Riley ex rel. Swanson v. Herbes, 524 N.W.2d 523, 526 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1994).
34. 3 ERIC J. MAGNUSON & DAVID F. HERR, MINNESOTA PRACTICE § 101.4 (3d ed.
1996).
35. BLACK’S, supra note 1, at 242 (defining comity as “a willingness to grant a
privilege, not as a matter of right, but out of deference and good will”).
36. State v. M.A.P., 281 N.W.2d 334, 336-37 (Minn. 1979); MAGNUSON & HERR,
supra note 34, at § 101.4.
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Rule 104.01 of Civil Appellate Procedure sets forth the rules for
37
determining timeliness of appeals in Minnesota for most civil cases.
Under Rule 104.01, an appeal must be taken within sixty days after the
38
entry of a judgment.
This time limit applies in all cases, unless a
39
different time is specified by statute. In juvenile protection cases, such
as the termination of a natural parent’s parental rights, Minnesota Rule of
Juvenile Procedure 82.02 subdivision 2 controls the time allowed to take
40
an appeal. Under Rule 82.02 subdivision 2, an appeal must be taken
41
within thirty days of the filing of the appealable order. “Limitations on
time to appeal are designed to expedite the final resolution of litigation,
42
with due consideration to fairness and certainty of procedure.” Failure
to file a timely appeal with the court is a defect that deprives the
43
appellate court of jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Furthermore, under
case law and statute, the appellate courts may not extend the time to
44
appeal.
Rule 103.01 of Civil Appellate Procedure requires that in addition
to serving notice on the court, “adverse parties” must also be served
45
within the appeals period. In contrast, Rule 82.02 subdivision 3 of the
Rules of Juvenile Procedure states that in addition to the court and
county attorney, “all parties” or their counsel, if represented, must be
46
served within the appeals period. Failure to properly serve a required
37. See MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 104.01; see also LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER & DAVID
W. LARSON, CIVIL APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE MINNESOTA COURT OF APPEALS 47
(1986).
38. MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 104.01 subd. 1.
39. MAGNUSON & HERR, supra note 34, at § 104.1.
40. In re Welfare of J.R., Jr., 655 N.W.2d 1, 2-3 (Minn. 2003).
41. MINN. R. JUV. P. 82.02 subd. 2.
42. E.C.I. Corp. v. G.G.C. Co., 306 Minn. 433, 435, 237 N.W.2d 627, 629 (1976)
(stating that a modification of judgment does not extend the time to appeal issues that
could have been raised in an appeal from the first judgment; holding that an incorrect
original judgment justified an equitable exception to the rule).
43. See, e.g., Tischendorf v. Tischendorf, 321 N.W.2d 405, 409 (Minn. 1982) (“In
Minnesota, the failure to make a timely appeal is a jurisdictional defect.”); Township of
Honner v. Redwood County, 518 N.W.2d 639, 641 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that
court of appeals lacks jurisdiction to hear a late appeal); Nichols v. Meilahn, 444 N.W.2d
872, 875 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (stating the limitation of time to appeal is jurisdictional).
44. Schaust v. Town Bd., 295 Minn. 571, 573, 204 N.W.2d 646, 648 (1973)
(holding that the court cannot extend the time for an appeal); In re LeBrun, 458 N.W.2d
139, 143 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the limitation of time to appeal is
jurisdictional and the court cannot extend the time for appeal). Minnesota Rules of Civil
Appellate Procedure 126.02 allows appellate courts to extend time periods but
specifically prohibits extending the time to appeal. MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 126.02.
45. See MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 103.01(1).
46. Compare MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 103.01 subd. 1 with MINN. R. JUV. P. 82.02
subd. 3(a). Rule 57.01 subdivision 1 of the Rules of Juvenile Procedure expressly
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party within the proper time period is a jurisdictional defect requiring
47
dismissal on the part of the appellate court and jurisdiction may not be
48
waived by the parties.
Although older case law is strict in stating that the Minnesota
49
Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction when an appeal is not timely filed, the
court in recent years has carved out an exception that it may hear any
50
appeal in the interests of justice whether the appeal was timely or not.
The court, recognizing that this power appears to contravene statute and
previous case law, justified its newly stated authority by questioning
whether the court’s jurisdiction to hear suits on appeal could be denied
51
The court noted that article 6, section 2 of the
by the legislature.
Minnesota Constitution grants the Minnesota Supreme Court “original
jurisdiction in such remedial cases as may be prescribed by law, and
52
appellate jurisdiction in all cases . . . .”
The court has stated that
regulations enacted by the legislature are acceptable on comity principles
to assist the court in the procedural aspects of appellate review, but not to
deny the court of its independent appellate authority to review any matter
53
it finds necessary in the interests of justice.
Although the court has
provides that the child’s guardian ad litem is a party to a juvenile protection matter.
MINN. R. JUV. P. 57.01 subd. 1.
47. See Johnson v. Nessel Town, 486 N.W.2d 834, 837 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992)
(dismissing appeal for failure to serve one of the respondents); Petersen v. Petersen, 352
N.W.2d 797, 797 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (deciding against appellant who failed to serve
notice of appeal on respondent within time limit).
48. See, e.g., Arndt v. Minn. Educ. Ass’n, 270 Minn. 489, 490, 134 N.W.2d 136,
137 (1965) (“[P]arties cannot waive the objection or by stipulation clothe this court with
authority to determine a belated appeal.”); Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 857 v. Seem, 263 Minn.
170, 174, 116 N.W.2d 395, 398 (1962) (holding parties cannot waive objection to
untimely appeal).
49. See, e.g., Ardnt, 270 Minn. at 490, 134 N.W.2d at 137 (holding the supreme
court loses jurisdiction on an untimely appeal); Schaust, 295 Minn. at 573, 204 N.W.2d at
648 (holding the supreme court cannot extend the time for an appeal).
50. See, e.g., Ruberg v. Skelly Oil Co., 297 N.W.2d 746, 749 (Minn. 1980)
(accepting untimely appeal as an appeal from judgment); Krug v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No.
16, 293 N.W.2d 26, 29 (Minn. 1980) (taking a late appeal in the interests of justice); State
v. M.A.P., 281 N.W.2d 334, 336-37 (Minn. 1979) (declining to take jurisdiction of late
appeal, but stating the authority to do so); E.C.I. Corp. v G.G.C. Co., 306 Minn. 433,
435-36, 237 N.W.2d 627, 629 (1976) (“The rules of this court are designed to effectuate
the orderly administration of justice and do not control its jurisdiction, for it retains the
constitutional power to hear and determine, as a matter of discretion, any appeal in the
interest of justice.”).
51. State v. M.A.P., 218 N.W.2d 334, 336 (Minn. 1979).
52. Id.; MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
53. M.A.P., 281 N.W.2d at 336-37; see also In re O’Rourke, 300 Minn. 158, 175,
220 N.W.2d 811, 821 (1974) (stating that past cases do not hold that the legislature may
by regulation deny the court its constitutional authority to review); MAGNUSON & HERR,
supra note 34, at § 101.4 (discussing that by exercising the power to hear untimely
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used this power to hear late appeals very sparingly, some commentary
has suggested that lower appellate courts may have the same inherent
54
power as the supreme court to take any appeal. Appellate courts have
55
so far refused to exercise that power.
C. Federal Rules for Extending the Time to Appeal Due to
Excusable Neglect
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5) permits the district
court to extend the time for filing an appeal in a civil case if the party
56
seeking the extension shows excusable neglect or good cause. A party
may make a motion for an extension before the time for appeal has run or
57
within a thirty-day grace period after the time for appeal has expired.
The good cause standard applies in situations where the delay was not
58
due to fault, excusable or otherwise.
Traditionally, the excusable
neglect standard is applied in situations where there is fault or the delay
59
is within the control of the movant. The authority to grant an extension
under Rule 4(a)(5) is limited to the district court; the court of appeals
60
cannot extend the time for filing notice of appeal.
In the 1993 United States Supreme Court decision of Pioneer
61
Investment Services v. Brunswick Associates, the Court moved beyond
the traditional excusable neglect standard and adopted a flexible standard
62
Such
that takes into account all the relevant circumstances.
circumstances include: “the danger of prejudice to [the nonmoving
party], the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial
appeals, the Minnesota Supreme Court is perhaps blurring the constitutional separation of
powers).
54. MAGNUSON & HERR, supra note 34, at § 101.4.
55. See Limongelli v. GAN Nat’l Ins. Co., 590 N.W.2d 167, 169 (Minn. Ct. App.
1999) (holding time to file notice of appeal may not be extended); Township of Honner v.
Redwood County, 518 N.W.2d 639, 641 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that even though
the Minnesota Supreme Court has indicated it has the authority to accept untimely
appeals, that authority has not been extended to the lower appeals courts).
56. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(5)(ii).
57. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(5)(i).
58. Gibbons v. United States, 317 F.3d 852, 854 n.3 (8th Cir. 2003) (explaining
advisory notes to 2002 amendment to rule 4(a)(5)).
59. Ponterelli v. Stone, 930 F.2d 104, 111 n.10 (1st Cir. 1991).
60. See, e.g., United States v. Detrich, 940 F.2d 37, 38 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding,
however, that timely communication from a pro se litigant constituted a request justifying
extension); In re Hoag Ranches, 846 F.2d 1225, 1229 (9th Cir. 1988); Savage v. Cache
Valley Dairy Ass’n, 737 F.2d 887, 889 (10th Cir. 1984). Federal rules prevent appellate
courts from enlarging the time for notice of appeals. FED. R. APP. P. 26(b).
61. 507 U.S. 380 (1993).
62. Id. at 395.
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proceedings, the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the
reasonable control of the movant, and whether the movant acted in good
63
faith.”
The Court held that “excusable neglect is understood to
encompass situations in which the failure to comply with a filing
64
deadline is attributable to negligence.” Furthermore, the determination
of whether failure to abide by a specified time limit constitutes excusable
65
neglect is an equitable one. The Pioneer decision makes it clear that in
some circumstances, attorney neglect, mistake, or carelessness can
66
constitute excusable neglect.
67
Although Pioneer was based on bankruptcy law, its excusable
neglect standard has been adopted by a majority of the federal circuits as
the proper standard for district courts to apply when exercising the
discretion of whether or not to extend the time to appeal a civil case
68
under Rule 4(a)(5). The Eighth Circuit adopted the Pioneer standard in
69
Fink v. Union Central Life Insurance Co. The Fink case was a major
departure from previous case law, which held that excusable neglect
could not be found when the failure to timely appeal was caused by
oversight or clerical error of the attorney or the attorney’s staff, or due to
70
the attorney’s busy schedule.
Several states have enacted rules that are similar to Rule 4(a)(5) and
63. Id.
64. Id. at 394.
65. Id. at 395.
66. See id. at 388 (stating that where the courts were empowered to accept late
filings due to excusable neglect, “Congress plainly contemplated that the courts would be
permitted, where appropriate, to accept late filings caused by inadvertence, mistake, or
carelessness, as well as by intervening circumstances beyond the party’s control”); see
also MOORE, supra note 25, at § 60.41[1][a] (interpreting effects of Pioneer to include
attorney neglect or negligence).
67. Pioneer actually defined excusable neglect as applied to FED. R. BANKR. P.
9006(b)(1). Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 382.
68. See, e.g., Halicki v. Louisiana Casino Cruises, Inc., 151 F.3d 465, 469 (5th Cir.
1998); Prizevoits v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 76 F.3d 132, 134 (7th Cir. 1996); Thompson v.
E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 76 F.3d 530, 533 (4th Cir. 1996); Advance Estimating
Sys., Inc. v. Riney, 130 F.3d 996, 997-98 (11th Cir. 1996); Virella-Nieves v. Briggs &
Stratton Corp., 53 F.3d 451, 454 (1st Cir. 1995); Fink v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 65
F.3d 722, 724 (8th Cir. 1995); Reynolds v. Wagner, 55 F.3d 1426, 1429 (9th Cir. 1995);
Weinstock v. Cleary, 16 F.3d 501, 503 (2d Cir. 1994); City of Chanute v. Williams
Natural Gas Co., 31 F.3d 1041, 1046 (10th Cir. 1994); see also David N. May, Pioneer’s
Paradox: Appellate Rule 4(a)(5) and the Rule Against Excusing Ignorance of Law, 48
DRAKE L. REV. 677, 695-96 (2000) (discussing federal courts that have applied the
Pioneer analysis to Rule 4(a)(5) and the effects of that application).
69. 65 F.3d 722, 724 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding that past decisions defining excusable
neglect are no longer controlling precedent).
70. See Vogelsang v. Patterson Dental Co., 904 F.2d 427, 431 (8th Cir. 1990)
(listing circumstances in which excusable neglect will not be found).
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allow the trial court to extend the time for appeal under a showing of
71
Of these states, Hawaii has adopted the Pioneer
excusable neglect.
72
standard of excusable neglect in reviewing untimely appeals.
Additionally, Colorado allows appellate courts to extend the time for
73
appeal; Iowa allows only the Iowa Supreme Court to extend the time
74
for appeal; while Pennsylvania allows late appeals in instances of non75
negligence.
Jurisdictions that either allow an extension for the time to file an
appeal due to excusable neglect or make similar allowances for late
appeals offer an obvious advantage to appellants compared with
jurisdictions that make no such accommodations. Minnesota falls into
the latter category. Although Rule 104.01 of the Minnesota Rules of
Appellate Procedure is comparable to Federal Rule 4, Rule 104.01 differs
from Rule 4 in that it contains no express provision allowing for the
76
extension of a party’s time to appeal under any circumstance.

71. See, e.g., D.C. CT. APP. R. 4(a)(4); HAW. R. APP. P. 4(a)(5); ME. R. APP. P.
2(b)(3); MISS. R. APP. P. 4(g); MONT. R. APP. P. 5(c); N.M. R. APP. P. 12-201(E)(2); N.D.
R. APP. P. 4(a); R.I. SUP. CT. ART. I, R. 4(a); UTAH R. APP. P. 4(e); VT. R. APP. P. 4.
72. Enos v. Pac. Transfer & Warehouse, Inc., 910 P.2d 116, 123-25 (Haw. 1996).
73. COLO. R. APP. P. 4(a).
74. Home-Crest Corp. v. Albright, 414 N.W.2d 89, 90 (Iowa 1987) (noting in dicta
that an order of the court allowing an extension of time had the effect of ratifying the
previous notice of appeal).
75. Bass v. Commonwealth, 401 A.2d 1133, 1135 (Pa. 1979) (holding that where
papers were prepared for filing six days prior to expiration date and the secretary in
charge of filing became ill, there was non-negligent failure to timely file an appeal).
Previous to Bass, Pennsylvania courts had only allowed nunc pro tunc appeals in
situations involving “fraud or some breakdown in the court’s operation.” Id. (citing West
Penn Power Co. v. Goddard, 333 A.2d 909, 912 (Pa. 1975)). The court in Bass granted
the appellant’s petition for an appeal nunc pro tunc based on its determination that
counsel for the appellant was in some degree a “public officer” and that an appellant
should not lose the day in court due to the non-negligent failure to timely file an appeal.
Id. The opinion in Bass elicited a vitriolic dissent that decried what it felt was a
wholesale disregard for the rules and a signal to litigants that timeliness requirements had
been abandoned. Id. at 1136-38 (Roberts, J. dissenting). Portions of the dissent bear a
remarkable resemblance to portions in the J.R. opinion. Compare Bass 401 A.2d at
1136-38 with In re Welfare of J.R., Jr., 655 N.W.2d 1, 4-5 (Minn. 2003). An appeal nunc
pro tunc will be allowed if: (1) the appeal was untimely due to non-negligent
circumstances relating to appellant or to appellant’s counsel, (2) the appeal is filed within
a short time after the appellant or appellant’s counsel learns of the delay and has an
opportunity to address the untimeliness, (3) the time period is very short, and (4) the
appellee is not prejudiced by the delay. Cook v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review,
671 A.2d 1130, 1131 (Pa. 1996).
76. Compare MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 104.01 with FED. R. APP. P. 4. See also
MAGNUSON & HERR, supra note 34, at § 104.2 (comparing Rule 104.01 of the Minnesota
Rules of Appellate Procedure with federal counterpart Rule 4).
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III. THE J.R. DECISION
A. The Facts as Presented by the Court
77

Dena Rodacker (“Appellant”) is the natural mother of six
78
Due to a lengthy history of mental illness and substance
children.
abuse, her parental rights to four of her children were involuntarily
79
terminated in two separate proceedings in 1996 and 1997.
J.R., Jr.,
80
Appellant’s fifth child, was born on April 13, 1998. Both Appellant
81
and J.R., Jr. tested positive for cocaine at the time of his birth. Initially,
Appellant’s parental rights were terminated and J.R., Jr. was placed in
82
foster care where he remained for two and one-half years.
Subsequently, the court vacated the termination order, and J.R., Jr. was
83
returned to Appellant in December 2000. On May 29, 2001, Appellant
claimed that she could not keep J.R., Jr. or A.I.R., her sixth child, safe
84
and voluntarily placed the children in foster care.
Less than two
months later, Appellant suffered a drug-induced psychotic episode,
which resulted in her being committed to the Willmar Regional
85
Treatment Center. Upon discharge, Appellant continued to use drugs
and alcohol in a manner that violated the conditions of her provisional
86
release.
In December 2001, a trial was held on a petition to terminate
87
Appellant’s parental rights.
Sheila Thomas, a licensed child
psychologist, testified that J.R., Jr. appeared anxious about having a
permanent place to live and that he viewed his sister and foster family as

77. Ms. Rodecker is engaging and well spoken. Telephone Interview with Dena
Rodecker, Appellant (June 27, 2003) (on file with the author). She strongly disputes the
facts of the case as presented by the court, still considers herself to be the mother of her
children and cares very much for their welfare. Id. Ms. Rodecker has spoken with other
attorneys about her case but cannot afford the requested fees. Id. She resides in Meeker
County and currently has custody of her seventh child. Id.
78. In re Welfare of J.R., Jr., 655 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Minn. 2003).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 7-8.
85. Id. at 8. Two days prior to appellant’s psychotic episode, appellant had refused
an attempt to be reunited with J.R., Jr., and suggested that he instead stay with his foster
parents. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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88

his family.
Thomas stated that another “disruption” in J.R., Jr.’s
placement would have a negative impact on his ability to trust and relate
89
to adults. The children’s guardian ad litem also testified that it would
be in the best interest of the children to terminate Appellant’s parental
90
rights. On Feb. 5, 2002, the trial court terminated Appellant’s parental
91
rights to J.R., Jr. and his sister A.I.R.
Appellant filed an appeal with the Minnesota Court of Appeals
92
contending that the trial court erred on several issues. The notice of
appeal was timely filed with respondent Meeker County and the court of
appeals, but the guardian ad litem was not served until fourteen days
93
after the thirty-day appeal deadline due to the attorney’s neglect.
In
determining the proper time period to take an appeal, the court of appeals
relied on Minnesota Statutes section 260C.415, which provides in part
that an appeal from juvenile court must be taken to the court of appeals
94
within thirty days of the appealable order.
The court then relied on
Rule 103.01 of the Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, which requires in
part that “adverse parties” must be served with notice of appeal within
95
the appeal period. The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
after the court of appeals determined that the guardian ad litem was
96
indeed an adverse party, and failure to serve a timely notice of appeal
97
was a jurisdictional defect.
Appellant then filed an appeal with the Minnesota Supreme Court
seeking a reversal of the court of appeals order, claiming that because
termination of parental rights cases are of such importance, a technical
violation of the rules of court procedure should not have prevented the
98
Appellant’s counsel stated that
original appeal from proceeding.
88. Id. at 8-9.
89. Id. at 9.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 9-11.
93. Id. at 2.
94. Id. at 2-3; MINN. STAT. § 260C.415 (2002).
95. J.R., 655 N.W.2d at 3; MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 103.01 subd. 1. A child’s guardian
ad litem is a party to a juvenile-protection matter. MINN. R. JUV. P. 57.01 subd. 1(a).
96. Older Minnesota case law has held that in some instances a guardian ad litem is
not an adverse party. See In re Welfare of J.B. 623 N.W.2d 640, 643 (Minn. Ct. App.
2001) (holding that a guardian ad litem was not an adverse party because the guardian
was not adverse to the appeal), overruled by In re Welfare of J.R., Jr., 655 N.W.2d 1
(Minn. 2003); Hofseth v. Hofseth, 456 N.W.2d 99, 102 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (holding
that guardian ad litem was not an adverse party because guardian ad litem was appointed
after the trial and had not previously taken an adverse position to the appellant).
97. J.R., 655 N.W.2d at 3.
98. Id. at 1-3.
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Appellant did not cause the delay and was in total reliance on the
services of her counsel; therefore, it was contended that Appellant should
99
not be punished for the attorney’s error.
B. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Analysis
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals order
and held that the failure to abide by the rules of procedure deprived the
100
Therefore, because the appeal was not
appellate court of jurisdiction.
timely served on the guardian ad litem, the appeal was not perfected and
101
In doing so, the court noted that the appellate
dismissal was required.
court erred in applying Minnesota Statutes section 260C.415 and Rule
103.01 of the Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, and should have
instead relied on Rules 82.01 and 82.02 of the Rules of Juvenile
102
Procedure.
The court stated that the end result was not affected in that
the thirty-day appeal period of Rule 82.01 subdivision 2 is identical with
that of the statute, and there was no dispute that the guardian ad litem
103
was an adverse party.
The court cited numerous cases where it had recognized its inherent
authority to take an appeal in the interests of justice, even when filing or
104
service requirements set forth in a rule or statute had not been met.
However, the court distinguished those cases from the case at hand by
emphasizing that such deviations were based upon peculiar facts, such as
recent changes in the law or interpretation issues, but not on the basis of
105
attorney negligence or oversight.
In doing so, the court rejected
99. Appellant’s Brief and Appendix at 17, In re Welfare of J.R., Jr., 655 N.W.2d 1
(Minn. 2003) (No. C2-02-378). Counsel for the appellant was appointed on March 1,
2002, six days prior to the deadline for filing an appeal. Id. at 16-17. Though counsel
represented Ms. Rodecker in the trial phase of J.R., counsel did not believe he had
authority to pursue an appeal prior to his court appointment as appellate counsel. Id. at
17.
100. In re Welfare of J.R., Jr., 655 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn. 2003).
101. Id. at 3, 6.
102. Id. at 2-3.
103. Id. at 3.
104. Id. at 3-4 (citing Ruberg v. Skelly Oil Co., 297 N.W.2d 746, 749 (Minn. 1980);
Krug v. Independent School Dist. No. 16, 293 N.W.2d 26, 29 (Minn. 1980); State v.
M.A.P., 281 N.W.2d 334, 336-37 (Minn. 1979); E.C.I. Corp. v G.G.C. Co., 306 Minn.
433, 435-36, 237 N.W.2d 627, 629 (1976)).
105. J.R., 655 N.W.2d at 4; see also Ruberg v. Skelly Oil Co., 297 N.W.2d 746, 749
(Minn. 1980) (holding that even though appeal was technically defective, the appeal
would be taken in the spirit of a recent rules change); Krug v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 16,
293 N.W.2d 26, 29 (Minn. 1980) (taking late appeal in the interests of justice because
district court amendment raised issue of whether the appeal ran from the original order or
the amended order); E.C.I. Corp. v G.G.C. Co., 306 Minn. 433, 436, 237 N.W.2d 627,
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Appellant’s request that the court excuse the delay by adopting an
analysis similar to that used in Rule 60.02 motions to vacate default
106
judgments.
The court expressed doubts as to the utility of a Rule
60.02 good cause exception made at the appellate level because the court
had traditionally used a four-prong test that required a reasonable defense
107
on the merits—an issue better evaluated by the trial court.
Furthermore, the court stated, “a good cause exception at the appellate
court level would eviscerate the uniform, impartial application of the
108
rules.”
The court emphasized the policy of placing the interests of the
109
foremost in a termination of parental rights case and the
child
fundamental need to strictly enforce the rules as a means of avoiding
unnecessary delays that could seriously affect a child’s opportunity to
110
have a permanent home.
Although the court recognized that such a
policy could result in some cases not being heard on appeal, it stated that
111
to do otherwise could equally inflict injustice upon the child.
Justice Paul H. Anderson, joined by Justice Page, filed a separate
112
opinion that concurred in part and dissented in part.
The dissent
argued that while a strict interpretation of the rules required dismissal,
such an interpretation was too restrictive in the context of terminating a
113
natural parent’s parental rights.
“We must be wary of a broom that
sweeps too broadly and rules that are so strictly enforced that justice has
114
The dissent recognized the
the very real potential of being denied.”
629 (1976) (holding that the parties knew the first judgment entered by the court was
incorrect and though notice of appeal was not timely filed with the first judgment, it was
timely filed with the amended judgment).
106. In re Welfare of J.R., Jr., 655 N.W.2d 1, 4-5 (Minn. 2003) (stating that allowing
a good cause exception for failure to follow the rules would strip the rules of their
impartial meaning and needlessly delay final resolutions).
107. Id. at 4 n.3 (quoting Nguyen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 558 N.W.2d
487, 490 (Minn. 1997)).
108. Id. at 4.
109. Minnesota courts balance three factors in determining the best interests of a
child: “(1) the child’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship; (2) the parent’s
interest in preserving the parent-child relationship; and (3) any competing interest of the
child.” In re Welfare of R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992). “Competing
interests include such things as a stable environment, health considerations, and the
child’s preferences.” Id. The interests of the parent and the child are not given equal
weight, and the best interests of the child are the leading consideration for the court. In
re M.H., 595 N.W.2d 223, 227 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
110. J.R., 655 N.W.2d at 5.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 6 (Anderson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
113. Id. at 6-7.
114. Id.
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court’s constitutional power to hear any appeal in the interests of justice
115
and stated that the court should have reached the merits of the case.
After reviewing the findings of the district court, the dissent agreed with
116
the order to terminate Appellant’s parental rights.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE J.R. DECISION
A. A Correct Answer to the Wrong Question
The decision of the court that an untimely appeal deprives the
appellate court of jurisdiction is correct and widely supported by
117
Additionally, Minnesota case law holds that
Minnesota case law.
failure to timely serve an adverse party is in and of itself a jurisdictional
118
defect.
This holding finds wide support among state courts; it is
universally held that untimely appeals in civil actions are void for lack of
119
This holds true even among cases that
subject matter jurisdiction.
120
involve termination of parental rights.
Furthermore, though the
Minnesota Supreme Court has the inherent authority to take jurisdiction
of an untimely appeal, this power has not been conferred to lower
121
appellate courts.
While the Minnesota Supreme Court was correct in its decision that

115. Id.
116. Id. at 11.
117. See, e.g., Tischendorf v. Tischendorf, 321 N.W.2d 405, 409 (Minn. 1982);
Schaust v. Town Bd. of Hollywood Township, 295 Minn. 571, 573, 204 N.W.2d 646,
648 (1973); Township of Honner v. Redwood County, 518 N.W.2d 639, 641 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1994); In re Welfare of D.B., 463 N.W.2d 301, 302 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
118. See, e.g., Johnson v. Nessel Town, 486 N.W.2d 834, 837 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992)
(dismissing appeal for failure to serve one of the respondents); Petersen v. Petersen, 352
N.W.2d 797, 797 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (holding against the appellant who failed to
serve notice of appeal on the respondent within time limit).
119. See, e.g., McCormack v. AmSouth Bank, 759 So. 2d 538, 541 (Ala. 1999);
Hahn v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 727 A.2d 317, 319 (D.C. 1999); Hays v. Hays, 612
N.W.2d 817, 819 (Iowa Ct. App. 2000); State v. Bassham, 762 N.E.2d 963, 965 (Ohio
2002). Even in jurisdictions that allow a trial court to extend the time for filing a late
appeal due to excusable neglect, the failure to timely file deprives the appellate court of
jurisdiction. See, e.g., In re Ak.V., 747 A.2d 570, 573-74 (D.C. 2000).
120. See, e.g., Wright v. Montgomery County Dep’t of Pensions and Sec., 423 So. 2d
256, 258 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982); In re Alyssa H. v. Charles H., 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 809, 812
(Ct. App. 1994); In re A.E., 994 P.2d 465, 467 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999); In re C.P., 777 So.
2d 470, 472 (La. 2001); In re Jasso v. Jasso, 752 P.2d 790, 791 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987).
121. See Township of Honner v. Redwood County, 518 N.W.2d 639, 641 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1994) (holding that even though the supreme court has indicated that it has the
authority to accept untimely appeals, that authority has not been extended to the lower
appeals courts).
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an untimely appeal deprived the lower appellate court of jurisdiction, the
court erred by not exercising its constitutional power to look beyond the
procedural rules in order to act in the interests of justice and hear the
appeal. In refusing to act, the court stated three primary objections: (1)
J.R. was distinguishable from previous cases where the court had elected
122
to deviate from the rules, (2) an analysis similar to a Rule 60.02 good
123
and (3) child
cause exception is unworkable at the appellate level,
124
Each
protection cases are in particular need of expeditious treatment.
of these objections will be examined in turn.
1. Distinguishing Termination of Parental Rights Cases from
Other Civil Cases
The Minnesota Supreme Court distinguished J.R. from past cases in
which it had elected to deviate from the rules and hear an untimely
125
appeal based on the peculiar facts of those cases.
In particular, the
court noted that when it had deviated from the rules, it did so only after
recent changes in the law or interpretation issues and not amid attorney
126
negligence or oversight.
In his dissent, Justice Paul H. Anderson
suggested that termination of parental rights cases should be
127
distinguished by their subject matter.
This concept that termination of
parental rights cases may at times be treated differently than other civil
cases is most apparent in situations where counsel has been appointed, as
it was in J.R., and there has been a claim of ineffective assistance of
128
counsel.
When a state court allows an untimely appeal in a termination of
parental rights case due to a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel,
the substantive theory runs that because due process requires counsel
appointed under a statutory directive to provide effective assistance, the
same standards for counsel appointed in a criminal proceeding may be
applied to counsel appointed in a termination of parental rights
122. In re Welfare of J.R., Jr., 655 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. 2003).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 5.
125. See supra note 105.
126. J.R., 655 N.W.2d at 4.
127. Id. at 6 (Anderson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“This is a too
restrictive interpretation of the law, especially in the context of termination of a natural
parent’s parental rights.”).
128. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 48 (2d Pocket ed. 2001) (defining ineffective
assistance of counsel under assistance of counsel as “[a] representation in which the
defendant is deprived of a fair trial because the lawyer handles the case unreasonably
[usually] either by performing incompetently or by not devoting full effort to the
defendant, [especially] because of a conflict of interest”).
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129

proceeding.
The party claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must
show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that actual prejudice
130
resulted.
In cases where ineffective assistance of counsel is shown,
courts have used a variety of methods to extend the time for appeal, such
131
or
as remanding the case back to the trial court for resentencing
132
133
designating that a writ of habeas corpus be filed with the trial court.
Ineffective assistance of counsel cases from other jurisdictions are
applicable to J.R. in that they stand for the proposition that termination of
parental rights proceedings affect important due process rights protected
134
by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
such cases may at times be treated in a manner different from other civil
135
cases.
Cases such as these also recognize that when a parent loses his
or her parental rights due to an attorney’s actions, there is little recourse
for the parent and monetary damages in a malpractice suit are wholly
136
inadequate.

129. See, e.g., Farley v. Dep’t of Servs. for Children, Youth & Their Families, 765
A.2d 951, 951 (Del. 2000) (stating parallel remedy between criminal and parental rights
termination cases); In re E.H., 609 So. 2d 1289, 1290-91 (Fla. 1992) (determining that a
writ of habeas corpus is the proper procedure in a civil parental rights termination case
where the appeal has been untimely); In re T.M.C., 988 P.2d 241, 243 (Kan. Ct. App.
1999) (extending fundamental fairness exception to termination order cases where it has
not been extended to other civil proceedings).
130. “The defendant must affirmatively prove that his counsel’s representation ‘fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness’ and ‘that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.’ ” Gates v. State, 398 N.W.2d 558, 561 (Minn. 1987) (quoting Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984)).
131. See, e.g., Farley, 765 A.2d at 951.
132. BLACK’S, supra note 1, at 638 (defining habeas corpus as “[t]he name given to
a variety of writs . . . having for their object to bring a party before a court or judge”).
133. In re E.H., 609 So. 2d 1289, 1290-91 (Fla. 1992).
134. See In re T.M.C., 988 P.2d 241, 243 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999) (“Termination of
parental rights proceedings affect important substantive due process rights.”); see also
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating in part that no state shall “deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”). But see In re Joshua R., 657
N.W.2d 209, 214 (Neb. 2003) (holding that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
does not extend to untimely appeal, and due process is not denied when appellant was
given fair and full opportunity to litigate).
135. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
136. See In re AK.V., 747 A.2d 570, 576-77 (D.C. 2000) (stating that the usual
remedy of money damages in a civil case for misfeasance or nonfeasance of counsel is
“wholly inadequate in a neglect case”); In re K.L., 91 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002)
(stating that money damages are inadequate in termination cases where the effect of
counsel’s deficiencies may be irrevocable). In presenting its holding, the court in K.L.
cited to Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759 (1982) for the proposition that
termination of parental rights cases differ from other civil cases in that once affirmed, the
result is final and irrevocable. K.L., 91 S.W.3d at 11.
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In J.R., the Meeker County District Court initially rejected
137
Rule
Appellant’s request for the appointment of appellate counsel.
61.02 of the Rules of Juvenile Procedure does not explicitly state that
counsel may be appointed in an appeal proceeding, and the court found it
138
lacked authority under the rule to do so.
Later, after taking a broad
view of Rule 61.02 and recognizing the substantial rights at stake in a
termination of parental rights proceeding, the court reconsidered its
139
position and appointed appellate counsel.
Recently, the Minnesota Supreme Court Juvenile Protection Rules
Committee proposed amending the Rules of Juvenile Procedure “to
extend through appeal, if any, the basic principle that each person
140
appearing in court has the right to be represented by counsel.”
Additionally, the committee proposed that the same attorney represent
141
The
the client in both the trial court and appellate court proceedings.
committee chose to delete the latter proposed amendment in part due to
concern by public defenders that such a rule could hinder an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim and that many trial court attorneys are not
142
necessarily experienced appellate court attorneys.
The concerns of the district court that an appeal be made available
in this case, and the concerns of public defenders that some trial court
attorneys are not experienced appellate court attorneys, suggest that the
Minnesota Supreme Court should have taken a more lenient view of
counsel’s failure to timely serve one of the parties to a juvenile matter.
Three unpublished cases indicate that Minnesota recognizes the
possibility of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a termination
of parental rights case, though none of the cases was in the context of an
143
untimely appeal.
Furthermore, the appellant in J.R. did not bring a
137. In re Welfare of J.R., Jr., 655 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2003), Amended Order, No. J701-50206 (Minn. 8th Jud. Dist. Ct. Feb. 27, 2002), rev’d, Order Appointing Appellate
Counsel, No. J7-01-50206 (Minn. 8th Jud. Dist. Ct. Feb. 28, 2002).
138. Id. See also MINN. R. JUV. P. 61.02 subd. 2(a) (“If the child’s parent or legal
custodian desires counsel but is financially unable to employ it, the court shall appoint
counsel to represent the parent or legal custodian in any juvenile protection matter in
which the court determines that such appointment is appropriate.”).
139. In re Welfare of J.R., Jr., 655 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2003), Order Appointing
Appellate Counsel, No. J7-01-50206 (Minn. 8th Jud. Dist. Ct. Feb. 28, 2002).
140. MINN. S. CT. JUV. PROTECTION RULES COMM., FINAL REPORT AND PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO THE MINNESOTA RULES OF JUVENILE PROCEDURE JUVENILE PROTECTION
RULES 15 (Apr. 7, 2003), available at http://www.courts.state.mn.us/cio/
public_notices/Juv_%20Prot_Rules_Report.doc (last visited Nov. 15, 2003).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 15-16.
143. In re D.F., No. C1-02-114, 2002 Minn. App. LEXIS 868, at *12 (Minn. Ct.
App. July 23, 2002); In re B.M.S., No. C5-98-708, 1998 Minn. App. LEXIS 1124, at *10
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motion for ineffective assistance of counsel and may not even have
144
known such an action was possible.
2. Looking to the Federal System for a Workable Analysis
The Minnesota Supreme Court denied appellant’s request that the
court adopt an analysis similar to that used in Rule 60.02 motions to
145
The court took this to mean a “good cause”
vacate default judgments.
exception, which requires a four-prong test that provides in part that the
party seeking relief must demonstrate a reasonable defense on the
146
merits.
The court denounced the workability of such an analysis at the
appellate level largely because a trial court is better suited to judge the
147
merits of any particular case.
Though not mentioned by the court, this
argument is buoyed by the suggestion that judging the merits of a
defense prior to arguments by the parties may appear to prejudice the
148
appeal.
Additionally, the court was correct in denying a “good cause”
exception largely based on the fact that a good cause standard applies in
situations where the delay was not due to fault, excusable or
149
otherwise.
Counsel for the appellant admitted that he was responsible
150
for the delay, and thus an excusable neglect exception would be more
appropriate.
Had the court chosen to review the reasons for failure to serve a
timely appeal under the mantle of excusable neglect, a more suitable
standard would be similar to that adopted by the United States Supreme
151
Court in Pioneer Investment Services v. Brunswick Associates.
Under
Pioneer, “excusable neglect” is understood to encompass situations in
(Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 1998); In re L.N., No. C8-90-698, 1990 Minn. App. LEXIS 969
at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 1990).
144. Appellant has stated that even though other attorneys have indicated they may
be able to help her, she is not able to afford their services. Telephone Interview with
Dena Rodecker, Appellant (June 27, 2003) (on file with author).
145. In re Welfare of J.R., Jr., 655 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. 2003).
146. Id. See also Nguyen v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 558 N.W.2d 487, 490
(Minn. 1997) (stating elements of four-prong good cause test).
147. J.R., 655 N.W.2d at 4 n.3.
148. “[T]his court must avoid any appearance of prejudging an appeal without the
record and arguments of the parties.” Maddox v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 400 N.W.2d
136, 139 n.1 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
149. “[T]he good cause standard ‘applies in situations where there is not fault—
excusable or otherwise;’ i.e., ‘the need for an extension is . . . occasioned by something
that is not within the control of the movant.’ ” Gibbons v. United States, 317 F.3d 852,
854 (8th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
150. Appellant’s Brief and Appendix at 17, In re Welfare of J.R., Jr., 655 N.W.2d 1
(Minn. 2003) (No. C2-02-378).
151. 507 U.S. 380 (1993).
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which failure to comply with a filing deadline is attributable to
152
The Pioneer standard takes into account all the relevant
negligence.
circumstances, including prejudice to the other party, the reason for the
delay, the duration of the delay, and whether the movant acted in good
153
faith.
Additionally, Pioneer suggests that in some circumstances,
154
negligence on the part of an attorney can constitute excusable neglect.
A majority of federal circuits, including the Eighth Circuit, have
adopted the Pioneer standard when reviewing untimely appeals due to
155
excusable neglect.
Admittedly, the federal system is operating under
appellate rules that allow district courts to extend the time for appeal,
156
However, the
whereas Minnesota rules make no similar allowance.
strength of the Pioneer standard is that it does not rely on a meritorious
defense and, even more favorably, Pioneer states that the determination
of whether the failure to abide by a specified time limit constitutes
157
excusable neglect is an equitable one.
The Pioneer standard is similar to a possible use of discretion as
described in dicta in the Minnesota Supreme Court decision of Nguyen v.
158
State Farm.
In Nguyen, the court analyzed a defendant’s failure to file
a proper request for trial and stated that if the matter was discretionary
with the court, reasons for exercising discretion would include: (1) that
failure to file was inadvertent and a result of oversight, (2) the party
acted with diligence upon learning of the oversight, and (3) the opposing
159
party was not prejudiced.
3. Conflicting Policy After J.R.
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s emphasis on the rights of the child
to a timely appeal largely shaped the court’s decision not to exercise its
160
inherent authority to take an untimely appeal in the interests of justice.
The court evidenced the importance of this policy by comparing Rule
82.02 of the Juvenile Rules of Procedure, which provides thirty days to
152. Id. at 394-95.
153. Id. at 395.
154. See id. at 394; see also MOORE ET AL., supra note 25, at § 60.41[1][a]
(interpreting the effects of Pioneer to include attorney neglect or negligence).
155. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
156. See supra Part II.C.
157. Pioneer Inv. Servs. v. Brunswick Assoc., 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993).
158. 558 N.W.2d 487, 491 (Minn. 1997).
159. Id. at 491.
160. See In re Welfare of J.R., Jr., 655 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 2003) (stating that
making an exception to the Rules of Procedure for child protection cases would be in
direct conflict with the policy that such cases in particular need to be expeditiously
handled).
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appeal juvenile protection matters, with Rule 104.01 of the Rules of Civil
Appellate Procedure, which provides sixty days to appeal in other civil
161
cases.
While the emphasis on such a policy may be outwardly admirable, it
may be equally shortsighted in that the United States Supreme Court has
stressed the importance of the appeals process in cases where parental
162
status is in question.
“Parental status termination is ‘irretrievably
destructive’ of the most fundamental family relationship. And the risk of
163
error . . . is considerable.”
Additionally, the Court has said that it
shares a strong interest with the parent in a correct decision and that in
164
some cases, it even has a stronger interest in informal procedures.
The policy carried forward from J.R.—that cases involving the
termination of parental rights are in particular need of expeditious
165
handling —runs contrary to the policy previously stated by the
Minnesota Supreme Court that favors granting relief when a judgment is
166
entered through no fault of the client.
By the court’s own admission,
this new and strongly stated emphasis on strict application of the rules of
procedure in cases involving the termination of parental rights may result
167
in some cases not being heard on appeal.
The new policy has quickly
168
been adopted by the lower courts and has been extended beyond the
situation of untimely filings to include a situation where the court refused
169
to give a mother more time to prove herself to be drug free.
161. Id. Compare MINN. R. JUV. P. 82.02 with MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 104.01.
162. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 121 (1996) (commenting in a termination of
parental rights case where a mother’s appeal was denied due to her inability to afford
court records).
163. Id.
164. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981) (discussing the right
of an indigent parent to receive court-appointed counsel in a termination of parental
rights proceeding).
165. J.R., 655 N.W.2d at 5.
166. See Nguyen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 558 N.W.2d 487, 491 (Minn.
1997) (agreeing that a client “should not be a victim of his attorney’s carelessness”);
Charson v. Temple Israel, 419 N.W.2d 488, 491 (Minn. 1988) (recognizing that even
under the general principles of agency where attorney neglect is chargeable to the client,
the court has scrutinized the client’s actions apart from that of the attorney); Duenow v.
Lindeman, 223 Minn. 505, 518, 27 N.W.2d 421, 429 (1947) (“Courts will relieve parties
from the consequences of the neglect or mistakes of their attorney, when it can be done
without substantial prejudice to their adversaries.”).
167. J.R., 655 N.W.2d at 5.
168. In re Children of S.C., 656 N.W.2d 580, 584 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (stating the
policy of J.R.—that child protection cases in particular need to be expeditiously
handled—in its holding that a motion to vacate judgment in termination of parental rights
proceeding was untimely filed).
169. In re Children of J.J., No. C9-02-1592, 2003 Minn. App. LEXIS 367 at *7 n.4
(Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2003) (citing to J.R. for the proposition that each delay in
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While the court was correct in stating that delays in termination of
parental rights can seriously affect a child’s chance for permanent
170
placement, the termination of a parent’s rights by no means guarantees
that a child will be adopted. The 2003 Adoption and Foster Care
Analysis and Reporting System Report (AFCARS Report) released by
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services shows that on a
national level, the number of children living in foster care whose parents
have had their parental rights terminated was more than thirty percent
171
higher than the total number of children adopted in the same year.
172
and the
The hard facts are that many children are never adopted,
national mean time for those who are adopted is sixteen months after
173
their parents’ parental rights have been terminated.
In Minnesota, the
174
mean is 25.65 months, the second highest in the nation.
Legal scholar Martin Guggenheim examined two states that have
expedited termination proceedings and found that as the number of
children freed for adoption soared, the number of actual adoptions failed
175
to keep pace.
In Minnesota, the state ward population rose by fifty176
one percent from 1993 to 1998.
In light of these statistics, the stated
terminating a parent’s rights equates to a delay in a child’s opportunity to have a
permanent home, while discussing a mother’s inability to stay with a treatment program
and the need to eliminate such a delay).
170. See J.R., 655 N.W.2d at 5 (paraphrasing NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND
FAMILY COURT JUDGES, RESOURCE GUIDELINES: IMPROVING COURT PRACTICE IN CHILD
ABUSE
&
NEGLECT
CASES
14
(Spring
1995),
available
at
http://www.pppncjfcj.org/html/publications.html) (last visited Nov. 15, 2003).
171. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE AFCARS REPORT 3, 5 (Mar.
2003), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/publications/afcars/report8.pdf
(last visited Nov. 15, 2003). The 2003 AFCARS Report compiles statistics for fiscal year
2001. Id. at 1. States are required to submit AFCARS data semi-annually. U.S. DEP’T
OF
HEALTH
&
HUMAN
SERVS.,
About
AFCARS,
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/dis/afcars/about.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2003).
172. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., ADOPTION FACT SHEET 2, at
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/adoption.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2003); Martin Guggenheim,
The Effects of Recent Trends to Accelerate the Termination of Parental Rights of
Children in Foster Care—An Empirical Analysis in Two States, 29 FAM. L.Q. 121, 129
(1995).
173. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., supra note 170, at 5.
174. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., Table 04-ADOPT, at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/dis/tables/time02.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2003).
This table is current as of Sept. 30, 2002. Id.
175. Guggenheim, supra note 172, at 127-34. The two states surveyed, Michigan
and New York, were chosen because they have a significant foster care population and
maintain statewide statistics. Id. at 126. Michigan data was from 1986 through 1992 and
New York data from 1987 through 1991. Id. Mr. Guggenheim was a professor of
Clinical Law and the Director of Clinical and Advocacy Programs at New York
University School of Law when he wrote the article. Id. at 121.
176. ESTHER WATTENBERG & MEGHAN KELLEY, A MEMO ON LEGAL ORPHANS: ARE
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policy of J.R. that cases involving the termination of parental rights are
177
in particular need of expediency, loses some of its intended luster.
It is not the intent of this case note to speculate on whether J.R., Jr.
would or would not have been adopted, nor is it the intent that the court
should have taken into account such a speculation when making its
178
decision on whether to allow an untimely appeal.
Rather, it is the
position of this note that in light of the above facts, an expeditious
termination of parental rights may not always be in the best interest of
the child, and it was unwise for the court to generalize that parental rights
179
termination cases are in particular need of such handling.
B. A Proposed Excusable Neglect Analysis for Untimely Appeals in
Termination of Parental Rights Cases
Jurisdictions that allow a trial court to extend the time for appeal
due to an attorney’s excusable neglect offer a distinct advantage to
appellants over a system such as Minnesota’s, which makes no
comparable exception for an extension. The Minnesota Supreme Court
should have identified this shortcoming and noted that in cases involving
the termination of parental rights, the accepted civil remedy allowing a
client to recover for the failure of counsel through damages in a
180
malpractice suit is wholly inadequate.
Furthermore, the court should
have recognized that particularly in Minnesota, the policy generalizing
that child protection cases are in particular need of expediency is not
181
statistically accurate.
By noting the above, the court would have had a
means of distinguishing termination of parental rights appeals from
appeals in other civil cases.

WE CREATING A NEW CLASS OF CHILDREN IN LIMBO? 2 (Apr. 30, 1999),
http://ssw.che.umn.edu/cascw/Various%20Articles/orphan5.pdf (last visited Nov. 15,
2003). Ms. Wattenberg is the Director of the Center for Advanced Studies in Child
Welfare at the University of Minnesota and a Professor at the School of Social Work. Id.
at 4.
177. See In re Welfare of J.R., Jr., 655 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 2003) (stating that
making an exception to the Rules of Procedure for child protection cases would be in
direct conflict with the policy that such cases in particular need to be expeditiously
handled).
178. Martin Guggenheim has suggested that before a parent’s parental rights are
terminated, “courts should require evidence regarding the probability of adoption and
insist that termination should not be ordered unless a high probability for adoption
exists.” See Guggenheim, supra note 172, at 135-36.
179. “[T]hese cases in particular need to be expeditiously handled.” J.R., 655
N.W.2d at 5 (emphasis added).
180. See supra Part IV.A.1.
181. See supra Part IV.A.3.
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Having distinguished J.R., the court should have looked to the
federal system for a workable analysis and reviewed the appellant’s
untimely notice of appeal using a flexible excusable neglect standard
similar to that introduced in Pioneer Investment Services v. Brunswick
182
Associates.
Under such an analysis, the court would determine: (1)
the prejudice to the appellee; (2) the length of the delay and its impact on
judicial proceedings; (3) the reason for the delay, including whether it
was within reasonable control of the appellant; and (4) the good faith
effort by the appellant. As stated in Pioneer, the court would take into
account all relevant circumstances. If the analysis was satisfied, the
court would then exercise its inherent authority to take an appeal in the
interests of justice even when the filing or service requirements of the
appeal are not timely.
While adopting an excusable neglect standard similar to that of
Pioneer would not have guaranteed the success of appellant’s request to
183
excuse the untimely notice of appeal on the guardian ad litem, such an
analysis would allow the court to make an equitable decision and give
the court much-needed flexibility in the area of parental rights
termination appeals. Furthermore, this analysis would relieve the court
of having to base its analysis on the merits of the case itself as is required
184
in a Rule 60.02 “good cause” analysis.
V. CONCLUSION
It is difficult to fault the Minnesota Supreme Court for strictly
following the rules of appellate procedure. In doing so, it made what
could have been a troublesome ethical decision much easier to swallow.
Add in the dismal facts of the case as presented, and the decision in J.R.
actually becomes quite palatable. However, had the mother been more
sympathetic or the trial court made some grievous error of law, then
182. 507 U.S. 380 (1993).
183. It has been suggested that under the Pioneer standard, attorney negligence may
constitute excusable neglect. MOORE ET AL., supra note 25, at § 60.41[1][a]. However,
case law has not shown this to be an accurate interpretation of Pioneer. See, e.g., Lowry
v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 211 F.3d 457, 464 (8th Cir. 2000) (“Notwithstanding the
‘flexible’ Pioneer standard, experienced counsel’s misapplication of clear and
unambiguous procedural rules cannot excuse his failure to file a timely notice of
appeal.”); Advanced Estimating Sys., Inc. v. Riney, 130 F.3d 996, 998 (11th Cir. 1997)
(holding that attorney’s misunderstanding of plain language of a rule cannot constitute
excusable neglect).
184. The court discussed its doubts as to the usefulness of a Rule 60.02 type analysis
to an appellate court because the analysis requires a reasonable defense on the merits and
the issue is better suited for the trial court. In re Welfare of J.R., Jr., 655 N.W.2d 1, 4 n.3
(Minn. 2003).
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quite possibly the J.R. decision would be viewed as a travesty. Someday
the described situation may arise—such a mother or father may be put in
such a situation. When that day comes and the aggrieved parent enters
185
the harsh spotlight of the court, the precedent of J.R. will be looming
in the shadows.
In J.R., the Minnesota Supreme Court had the opportunity to adopt
an analysis that would have allowed it to “look beyond procedural rules
186
The court’s initial reliance
in order to act in the interests of justice.”
and subsequent rejection of a Rule 60.02 analysis provided the court with
a convenient and outwardly legitimate means of turning away a parent
who has lost the right to appeal the termination of her parental rights due
to a mistake of her attorney. But at what cost? Certainly implementing
an excusable neglect analysis similar to that used by the federal system
would have been a judicial leap, but the court by its own admission
stated that under a strict application of the rules of procedure, some cases
187
likely will not be heard.
Surely this does not provide justice for the
child or the parent. The power to terminate a parent’s rights has been
described as “the family law equivalent of the death penalty in a criminal
188
case.”
By adopting a flexible analysis tailored to termination of
parental rights cases, the court would be in a better position to make
equitable decisions in the best interests of justice and not be tethered to a
difficult precedent.

185. “Particularly where a precedent or series of precedents has been treated as
authoritative for a long time, courts are generally reticent to deviate from that policy,
even if they would rule otherwise if the question were one of first impression.” 20 AM.
JUR. 2D Courts § 147 (1995). “We should not be quick to overrule long-standing
precedent . . . . We can overrule a previous decision only when there is good reason to do
so. Only if we are convinced that the prior decision is erroneous should we not let that
decision stand.” State v. Hamm, 423 N.W.2d 379, 380 (Minn. 1988).
186. J.R., 655 N.W.2d at 6 (Anderson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
187. Id. at 5.
188. In re Hoffman, 776 N.E.2d 485, 487 (Ohio 2002); see also In re K.D.L. v. State,
58 P.3d 181, 186 (Nev. 2002) (stating that termination of a parent’s rights is “tantamount
to imposition of a civil death penalty”).
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